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Portrait of the Judge as an Artist (with
apologies to James Joyce)
MARGARET MARY FITZPATRICK and JOHN J.
SHERLOCK*
Presiding at the Pace Law School commencement June,
1982, Acting Dean James D. Hopkins urged the graduates to be
like Joyce's Stephen Daedalus and "go to encounter for the mil-
lionth time the reality of experience and to forge in the smithy
of [their] soul[s] the uncreated conscience of [their] race."' To
the glimpse of Judge Hopkins' these words provide, we owe our
title.
We embark on this effort with not a little trepidation for oft
we have thought there is only one soul with the flair accurately
to portray Judge Hopkins in words. That person is the Judge
himself and he will never do it. Would that he would write the
portrait of the Judge as a man, lawyer and artist that he is.
Law is the science that lives by the written word. Words are
the tools of the law and when artfully used the result is a joy for
"true ease in writing comes from art."8 The ease with which
Judge Hopkins wrote was amazing and he seemed to be most at
ease when he was writing. The art at first escaped us but more
about that later.
We see now why the Judge's writing came so easily. It was
because of the process and preparation that preceded it. We feel
that the writing never started until the answer was formed. The
quality of the effort that had gone into finding the right answer
made the writing easy. But so immersed were we in this process
* Margaret Mary Fitzpatrick, a 1982 graduate of Pace University School of Law,
was a Law Intern in Justice Hopkins' Chambers in 1981. John J. Sherlock, J.D. Syracuse
University College of Law, 1948, was Law Secretary to Justice Hopkins from 1973 to
1981.
1. J. Joycz, PoRTamr OF THE ARTST AS A YOUNo MAN 252-53 (1966).
2. His official title is Justice Hopkins, as an elected Supreme Court Justice. We
adopt the common parlance and everyday usage we have become accustomed to.
3. A. PoPE, ESSAY ON CmTZcisM line 362 (1711).
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that it was not until we were asked to do this piece that we dis-
covered it was art we were engaged in. How did the process that
produced this art work?
We discovered five stages which were not a formal proce-
dure but rather a pattern which evolved from Judge Hopkins'
commitment to quality at every stage of preparation. The Judge
assigned the matter to one of us by giving us copies of the briefs
of counsel or a law-assistant's report. He generally made com-
ments about the basic facts and the legal issue or issues
presented. His style was somewhat like the comments that ap-
pear on the inside flaps of books - enough to pique your inter-
est but never enough to give away the substance. It was his habit
never to indicate any opinions he had formed, the better to give
us room for our own thoughts. The assignment had no time limit
attached. The Judge expected quality and recognized that we
were individuals. Each of us found our own pace to achieve thor-
ough familiarity with the case and return to him for the second
stage, discussion. Discussion was free ranging and open. We ar-
gued, advocated, shifted from reason to reason and viewpoint to
viewpoint. No judgments were made at this stage but opinions
emerged and from those opinions we formulated questions.
Framing the questions set the stage for the research which was
the next step. It was the careful articulation of those questions
which made research the simplest part of our task. Our objective
was to look through the library and find an answer.
Once the research yielded some applicable law we entered
the penultimate stage. Thinking, weighing, and balancing forged
a final analysis. This was not a communal or shared experience.
The person assigned to the matter worked through the ques-
tions, applied the law, attempted to perceive the future and the
results that would accrue. Our conclusion was submitted to the
Judge in a written memo.
The final stage was reached when Judge Hopkins picked up
his pen. Armed with his knowledge of the law, his own conclu-
sion and the results of our interaction, he sat to write. We mar-
veled at his ease. His writing flowered into straightforward, ef-
fortless, essential expressions of not only the law but the human
condition as well. It is impossible to portray the tempo of this
process except to say that it suited all concerned.
Judge Hopkins' respect for us and our opinions was essen-
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tial to our daily pattern. It produced separate thoughts and
opinions and a cumulative effect which gave Judge Hopkins a
broader base from which to work. Secure in his position, he
wrote legal decisions which he often visited with a poetic touch.
We have chosen some examples from his decisions to demon-
strate his special talent for symbolism and for capturing the es-
sence of a case in melodic passage.
The process was art at work in decision writing. Decision
writing is intended to be didactic. Hence, it often becomes pe-
dantic, heavy, somber and convoluted. Judge Hopkins' decisions
are didactic without boring pedantry. His sentences are simple
and direct, never heavy with the unnecessary phrase or adjec-
tive. He writes only what needs to be written.
Judge Hopkins wrote about marriage on a number of occa-
sions. The facts of each case enabled him to approach the con-
cept of marriage with a different angle of vision ranging from a
tender definition of marriage to a straightforward acceptance of
the hollowness that can exist in the name of marriage. In Phil-
lips v. Phillips,' for example, a wife sought to dissolve a thirty-
five year marriage on the grounds of cruel and inhuman conduct;
the trial court denied relief and the appellate division affirmed.
In examining the facts in light of the length of the marriage,
Judge Hopkins concluded:
A marriage, composed as it is of the delicate interrelationship of
attitudes and temperaments, expressing the emotional and
physical characteristics of two people changing over the years,
must be placed in the balance by an objective and careful ap-
praisal of the Judge with the effect of the conduct of the parties
upon that interrelationship and the increased burden which the
law itself imposes on the parties when the marriage has lasted for
nearly 35 years. We do not believe that the discretion of Special
Term in the discharge of its task here was improperly exercised.'
In the Judge's discussion of the division of marital assets, he
uses the symbol of iron fetters to show that law cannot be unre-
sponsive to reality, and in a passage of depth and wisdom fairly
captures the spectrum of marital relationships:
4. 70 A.D.2d 30, 419 N.Y.S.2d 573 (2d Dep't 1979).
5. Id. at 36, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 576 (emphasis added).
19831
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We do not think that the rigid application of principles of
property or trust law should govern the distribution of an income
tax refund upon the dissolution of a marriage and the division of
marital assets. Each case must be decided on its own facts, and
the court should not be fettered in achieving an equitable appor-
tionment of assets on the dissolution of a marriage by the iron
clasp of a mechanical formula.
The financial arrangements between husband and wife are
intensely personal; what suits one household would throw an-
other in disarray. Sometimes the spouses join in discharging the
financial responsibilities of the family; sometimes one spouse de-
fers to the other in managing their affairs. Sometimes they agree
to keep their individual earnings and property separately; some-
times they agree to merge them. Sometimes their agreement is
formal; in most instances it is not. All of these circumstances
must be weighed by the court when the marriage is no longer sus-
tainable and the distribution of the family assets is the issue. The
filing of a joint income tax return must therefore be viewed in the
circumstances of the general financial background of the mar-
riage; moreover, it should be construed as a response to the tax
statutes designed to confer a benefit to the married couple. In
itself the exercise of the option by the spouses to file a joint re-
turn should not be interpreted as the conclusive memorial of the
intent to create a joint tenancy or to make a gift by one for the
other. We should look beyond the simple execution of the return
to the circumstances of the marriage.
On another occasion, the Judge looked at a marriage with a
short and turbulent history and wrote directly to the point.
There was little in the case to induce him to ponder the nature
of marriage:
The brief duration of the marriage, the relative stations of the
parties before the marriage and after its acrimonious ending, the
unfortunate attitudes exhibited by the parties toward one another
and their differing aspirations and demands persuade us that the
marriage is unworkable and should be brought to legal termina-
tion. Indeed, the record evinces a marriage foredoomed to failure
nearly at the start. There is little to save in a marriage when
nothing has grown out of it. 7
6. Angelo v. Angelo, 74 A.D.2d 327, 333, 428 N.Y.S.2d 14, 17-18 (2d Dep't 1980)
(emphasis added).
7. John W.S. v. Jeanne F.S., 48 A.D.2d 30, 32-33, 367 N.Y.S.2d 814, 817 (2d Dep't
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In the course of exploring the tapestry, we noticed another
artistic aspect of the Judge's style. He used reiteration so care-
fully crafted that his point became clearer without making his
decision redundant and convoluted.
In a negligence case involving three defendants, a property
owner, a tenant and a subtenant, the jury found for the injured
plaintiff and the question on appeal was how much money each
of the tortfeasors had to contribute. Judge Hopkins wrote,
A relationship of a derivative or vicarious character between the
tort-feasors need not be demonstrated and the shares of the pay-
ment of the judgment are determined by an analysis of the duties
owed to the injured party in the situation out of which the injury
was incurred and the balancing of the equities inherent in the
situation.8
His statement explained how the court approached the problem.
He stated what actions of each party constituted negligence and
then he rendered his judgment. In that conclusion was the echo
of the test he had already set out.
Thus, the injury to the plaintiffs was produced by two dis-
tinct causes; the proportion of the shares of the payment of the
judgment should be fixed between the perpetrators of the causes
not per capita but per stirpes. Both from the nature of the duties
cast on them and the sense of the extrinsic equities, the burden of
the loss should be equally divided between Rohde as one prime
actor and Grupenel and Queens Park as the other.'
In another case examining the liabilities of several defen-
dants, the question hinged not on apportionment but rather on
the status of the injured plaintiff vis-a-vis each defendant. Judge
Hopkins explained the nature of the duty owed.
But thus far in our law the content of the duty owed by the land-
owner varies as the status of the injured party varies from tres-
passer, to licensee, to business invitee. In drawing these distinc-
tions, the courts have categorized a social invitee as a licensee,
though "a verbal paradox" may thereby seem to be engendered. 10
1975).
8. McCabe v. Century Theatres, 25 A.D.2d 154, 157, 268 N.Y.S.2d 48, 51 (2d Dep't
1966) (citations omitted).
9. Id. at 158, 268 N.Y.S.2d at 52.
10. Cesario v. Chiapparine, 21 A.D.2d 272, 276, 250 N.Y.S.2d 584, 588 (2d Dep't
1983]
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There followed several pages of careful analysis of the parties
involved and the content of duty. He reiterated:
So long as the classification of visitors to land distinguishes be-
tween licensee and invitee in the degree of care which the land-
owner must exercise, the decision as to the character of the visitor
and as to the liability of the landowner will logically vary, though
the facts of the accident remain the same. 1
He then concluded as to the status of the plaintiff and the dif-
fering liabilities of the defendants.
In more recent years, the Judge was asked to decide
whether the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corpora-
tion Law12 (MVAIC) necessarily had to dovetail with the no
fault statute.1 3 The dispute arose over whether an alighting pas-
senger is nonetheless an occupant because of an MVAIC defini-
tion. To approach the problem, Judge Hopkins stated the fac-
tors that concerned him.
Whether the same term must be accorded the same meaning
under different statutes entails a consideration of several factors
- whether the statutes are in pari materia, whether the statutes
have common aims and whether the public policy underlying the
statutes demands similar treatment of the term.14
He continued with an analysis of his triple-pronged considera-
tion and in a poetic reiteration he reached a conclusion.
In short, we see not grounds for straying from the ordinary
meaning of pedestrian in favor of a judicial gloss imparted on an-
other word written in a different statute having a different
purpose.15
Another aspect of Judge Hopkins' writing style was his sen-
sitivity to the reality that existed behind the surface mechanics
of the situation. In a question of whose law to apply, he rejected
both an out-worn rule and a mathematical contact count to de-
1964).
11. Id. at 279, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 591.
12. N.Y. INs. LAW §§ 5201-5225 (McKinney Supp. 1982).
13. N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 670-678 (McKinney Supp. 1982).
14. Colon v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 64 A.D.2d 498, 502, 410 N.Y.S.2d 634, 637 (2d
Dep't 1978).
15. Id. at 504, 410, N.Y.S.2d at 638.
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scribe a striving for justice.
Thus, in place of the mechanical rule of lex loci delicti or the
arithmetical rule of counting contacts, the Court of Appeals has
adopted an analytical process of evaluating the facts and interests
involved in the litigation. The objective of the search rests in ar-
riving at a just and reasonable selection of the law in its relation
to the total circumstances of the case. We look not for absolutes,
but for relative justice in the setting of the parties.16
On another occasion a pharmacist defended his unlawful
practice of writing prescriptions using fictitious names by saying
the prescriptions were not falsely made since he (the pharma-
cist) had actually executed them. Judge Hopkins penetrated the
mechanical defense by saying:
A prescription is a physician's written order for the prepara-
tion and use of a medicine by a patient. If on his prescription
form a physician inscribes the name of a person other than the
person for whom the prescription is in fact written, the prescrip-
tion cannot be said to be genuine. In its character as a prescrip-
tion, it does not represent the reality of which it purports to be
an embodiment. Thus, a physician's inscription of a deceased or
fictitious patient's name on his prescription form constitutes
more than the making of a false statement of fact. If he so exe-
cutes his prescription form in order to defraud, his conduct falls
within the interdiction of the statute. He has contrived a coun-
terfeit document, valid on its face and having legal effect, for the
purpose of defrauding another. 17
An attorney who failed to make timely service of a notice of
claim sought to avoid malpractice liability by saying that the cli-
ent's claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Judge Hop-
kins used the "continuous treatment" rationale to impress liabil-
ity and in careful symbolism drove home the point that you
cannot have your cake and eat it too.
We note, too, that a contrary rule concerning the accrual of a
cause of action against an attorney for malpractice in the manage-
ment of litigation might well lead to procrastination by the attor-
16. Pahmer v. Hertz Corp., 36 A.D.2d 252, 255, 319 N.Y.S.2d 949, 953 (2d Dep't
1971) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
17. People v. Klein, 23 A.D.2d 95, 96, 258 N.Y.S.2d 783, 784 (2d Dep't 1965) (cita-
tions omitted) (emphasis added).
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ney to postpone the inevitable event of defeat. The author of the
disaster should not be enabled to chart the strategy to avoid the
liability for his own negligence. Otherwise, negligence could be
disguised by the device of delay, and an attorney rewarded by
immunity from the consequence of his negligence.1 8
Note here also, the use of analogy rather than having the deci-
sion reflect someone's error.
Nor is the form all lost in art; it also manifests itself in
scholarship and instruction. In People v. John F. McNeill,"9
Judge Hopkins reviewed a habeas corpus petition of a Mat-
teawan inmate named John Butler, who claimed he was compe-
tent to stand trial. The state argued that Butler was suffering
from dementia praecox, paranoid type, and was unable to under-
stand the charges brought or make a competent defense. In a
one-page opinion (with the use of footnotes, a practice he
seemed later to have abandoned), Judge Hopkins presented the
current law on the entire range of mental capacity in the crimi-
nal process from the test of mental capacity which the law im-
posed upon a person accused of crime to determine whether he
is capable of standing trial, to the test for legal responsibility for
the crime charged, to the test for the capacity to be punished
after conviction to the test for disposition of the accused after
acquital. In addition, the Judge wrote a thorough explanation of
the disease of acromegaly, from which Butler suffered. To pre-
sent this case in quotes does it a disservice. It must be read.
The bane of law students today and from time immemorial
has been the rule against perpetuities. Judge Hopkins, writing in
1981, encapsulizes not only the philosophy of the rule, but also
marks its distinction from restraints on alienation in prose as
fine as a legal decision permits.
In a general sense, the rule against perpetuities limits the
power of an owner to create future interests, whereas the rule
against restraint on alienation prohibits the owner from creating
provisions blocking his grantee from disposing of the property.
More to the point, here the terms of the option do not extend
beyond the period of lives in being and a term of 21 years. Under
18. Siegel v. Kranis, 29 A.D.2d 477, 480, 288 N.Y.S.2d 831, 835 (2d Dep't 1968) (em-
phasis added).
19. 30 Misc. 2d 722, 219 N.Y.S.2d 722 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess County 1961).
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either contingency of the option, it must be exercised within the
lifetime of Boddy or within 30 days after his death-both contin-
gencies thus being within the permissible period of the statute.
We do not accept the defendant's construction of the option that
there was no duty on him to notify the plaintiffs of Boddy's
death, thereby, according to his argument, lengthening the exer-
cise of the option possibly beyond the 21-year period provided by
the statute. As we interpret the language of the option, the plain-
tiffs' time to exercise it began on "the receipt of notice of death,"
and we think it a reasonable conclusion that notification of death
would be given by Boddy's heirs or successors in interest to Witt
or his successors.
In contrast, the rule against restraints on alienation is not
now codified, but remains a doctrine controlled by decisional law.
It was early stated that where an estate was conveyed in fee sim-
ple, a condition forbidding alienation by the grantee was void.
The reason for the rule was said to be that the ownership of the
fee could not exist in one person while the ownership of the right
of alienation existed in another. That statement, of course, em-
bodies a conceptual difficulty; but the public policy in favor of
facilitating the free transfer of property is undoubtedly a more
substantial ground for the rule. 0
In presenting Judge Hopkins with a copy of the Pocket
Constitutionalist, Professor Paul R. Baier inscribed, "To Justice
James Hopkins, whose judicial flame has always reminded me of
Benjamin Cardozo." We can substantiate Professor Baer's enco-
mium. Cardozo stated the traditional dilemma of the criminal
law in the following words in People v. Defore:21
The question is whether protection for the individual would
not be gained at a disproportionate loss of protection for society.
On the one side is the social need that crime shall be repressed.
On the other, the social need that law shall not be flouted by the
insolence of office. There are dangers in any choice.22
Judge Hopkins in writing the now famous People v. Clayton"3
20. Witt v. Disque, 79 A.D.2d 419, 424-25, 436 N.Y.S.2d 890, 893-94 (2d Dep't 1981)
(citations omitted).
21. 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585, cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926).
22. Id. at 24, 150 N.E. at 589.
23. 41 A.D.2d 204, 342 N.Y.S.2d 106 (2d Dep't 1973).
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decision, which became a statutory enactment,24 said:
On the one side the statute allows an escape from the rigor-
ous rules controlling the dismissal of an indictment only for rea-
sons arising from substantial defects in supporting evidence or re-
quired procedure; on the other side, the statute erects the well-
considered discretion of the court as a safeguard to prevent a dis-
missal of an indictment unless the public interests are as fully
protected as the individual interests of the defendant for justice
and mercy."5
We mentioned quality earlier in describing our method of
finding the right answer. One summer, coming upon Zen and
the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance,6 the thought was to get a
copy and bring it to the Judge's home when delivering court pa-
pers. Much to our dismay at not being first, but not really to our
surprise, we noted a hard cover copy in his den. In that book
there is much discussion of "Quality" but these words in that
regard are most apropos of the Judge:
But now we have with us some concepts that greatly alter the
whole understanding of things. Quality is the Buddha. Quality is
scientific reality. Quality is the goal of Art.2 7
On another occasion, at his suggestion, Thornton Wilder's
Ides of March28 was read. We hastened to call especially to his
notice the following, attributed by Wilder to Julius Caesar:
I am accustomed to being hated. Already in early youth I dis-
covered that I did not require the good opinion of other men,
even of the best, to confirm me in my actions. I think there is
only one solitude greater than that of the military commander
and of the head of the state and that is the poet's - for who can
advise him in that unbroken succession of choices which is a
poem? It is in this sense that responsibility is liberty; the more
decisions that you are forced to make alone, the more you are
aware of your freedom to choose. I hold that we cannot be said to
be aware of our minds save under responsibility and that no
greater danger could befall mine than that it should reflect an
24. Clayton is codified at N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. LAW § 210.40 (McKinney 1982).
25. People v. Clayton, 41 A.D.2d at 208, 342 N.Y.S.2d at 110.
26. R. PIRSIG, ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE (1974).
27. Id. at 276.
28. T. WILDER, THE IDES OF MARCH 34 (1948).
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effort to incur the approval of any man, be it a Brutus or a Cato. I
must arrive at my decisions as though they were not subject to
the comment of other men, as though no one were watching."29
We were stymied once again when he took the very words from
his wallet.
His declining to be the presiding justice of the second de-
partment caused some wonderment. After all it was a prestigious
judicial office and who declines prestige! He preferred to be a
judge and only a judge. This is the true devotion of the artist.
29. Id. at 33.
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